On Israel's shift to the right
It was once believed by Israelis that the drift toward extremism was a property of the Palestinian side. Israelis, particularly on the left, liked to point out that today’s moderates, the PLO, were yesterday’s extremists. This process, however, is turning out to hold true on the Israeli side as well.
Yesterday’s extreme views in Israel are today’s consensus. A cross-current process has characterized Israeli extremism, with once radical views on both left and right getting their day in the mainstream.
The leftist extremist views of the 60s and 70s—demanding the return of the occupied territories for peace right after the six days war, warning of the future cancerous effects of an occupation, later calling for negotiations with the PLO for a two-state solution—have become official policy by the 1990s.
But with the failure of Oslo, the rise of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, the tide has now turned. Currently in Israel, right wing positions once considered unspeakable in polite company—population transfer; exclusion, censure or deportation of Israeli Arabs—are slowly but insistently inching into the mainstream.
The chief strategist and spokesman for this approach is current foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman, who has emerged in recent years as the type of cunning and charismatic politician who can thrive in Israeli politics even without having had a stellar army background or an ultra-orthodox flock on call. Lieberman articulated the essence of his vision in his controversial UN speech in September.
In his speech, he sought to first refute the notion that the Palestinian issue is the heart of Middle East conflict. He said: “More than ninety percent of the wars and war victims of the Middle East since the Second World War did not result from the Israeli Palestinian conflict and are in no way connected to Israel, stemming rather, from conflicts involving Moslems or conflicts between Arab States.”
Then, he sought to refute the notion that the settlements are the stumbling block to peace, noting that, “all of Judea, Samaria and Gaza were under Arab control for 19 years, between 1948 and 1967. During these 19 years, no-one tried to create a Palestinian state. Peace agreements were achieved with Egypt and Jordan despite the presence of settlements. And the opposite is also true: we evacuated twenty-one flourishing settlements in Gush Katif, and we transferred more than 10,000 Jews and in return, we have Hamas in power and thousands of missiles on Sderot and southern Israel.”
Noting that many blame the conflict for weakening response to Iran, he argued that the causal arrow goes in the opposite direction: “in searching for a durable agreement with the Palestinians, one which will deal with the true roots of the conflict and which will endure for many years, one must understand that first, the Iranian issue must be resolved.”
Lieberman then proposed that an end to the conflict must come in two stages: first, to deal with “emotional” wounds, “we should focus on coming up with a long-term intermediate agreement, something that could take a few decades. We need to raise an entire new generation that will have mutual trust and will not be influenced by incitement and extremist messages.”
Second, a redrawing of the borders must occur, creating a physical and national separation between the two ethnic groups at odds, Jews and Arabs. “Where effective separation has been achieved, conflict has either been avoided, or has been dramatically reduced or resolved. Consider the cases of the former Yugoslav republics, the split-up of Czechoslovakia and the independence of East Timor, as cases in point. Thus, the guiding principle for a final status agreement must not be land-for-peace but rather, exchange of populated territory. Let me be very clear: I am not speaking about moving populations, but rather about moving borders to better reflect demographic realities.”
He concluded with this reminder: “almost 4000 years during which the Jewish People were born in the Land of Israel, while developing the corpus of ethical and intellectual treasures that have been instrumental in giving rise to Western Civilization. 2000 years of forced exile, and interim conquest by Byzantines, Arabs, Mamelukes, Ottomans and others, cannot, and never will, impair the unbreakable bonds of the Jewish People to its homeland. Israel is not only where we are. It is who we are.”
All this sounds well and reasoned, until you consider context, logic, and subtext.
First, whether or not the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is marginal in terms of numbers, it is not marginal to the Israeli and Palestinian people at its center. And symbols attain their force not from their absolute size but from their emotional resonance. For example, Israel’s problems in absolute terms are dwarfed by problems of many other countries. Should the US therefore, in Lieberman’s view, reduce its aid to Israel to reflect that? More pointedly, most Jews don’t live in Israel, which somehow does not stop Lieberman from claiming in his speech that for Jews, “Israel is not only where we are. It is who we are.”
Second, individual settlements may or may not be stumbling blocks for peace. But overall, the settlement movement is enabled by, and manifests, the occupation, which is an inherent stumbling block for peace. The very history of the Jewish people in Israel attests to this simple fact, characterized as it’s been, in Lieberman’s own proud telling, by continual struggle against occupiers!
Moreover, applying Lieberman’s own logic, it is clear that the occupation has not bought Israel peace, quiet, and security, but rather conflict, death, world status erosion, moral decline, and toxic internal strife. Why keep such a failing program?
Third, the idea that Iran is the root cause of the conflict also defies Lieberman’s own logic. He argues that the fact the conflict continued despite withdrawals and peace achieved despite settlements renders withdrawals and settlements inessential to the conflict. But the conflict also existed well before Iran became a player; actually during the times Iran was Israel’s ally. So how can Iran be its root cause?
Now, Lieberman is right about the toxic lack of trust between Israelis and Palestinians, but there’s no evidence that a vague “intermediate” solution is more likely to hasten change than a radical shift denoted in a comprehensive peace agreement. In fact, social science shows that waiting for an attitude change to bring about a change in behavior is usually a rotten idea. It is more effective to change the laws first, and let people learn to adjust their attitudes accordingly.
Politically, examples abound of the potential efficacy of a dramatic land-for-peace agreement in ensuring stability. The Israel-Egypt peace agreement is one case in point. Egypt was Israel’s largest, most vehement and powerful enemy between 1948-1977, responsible for most Israeli war casualties. Then, Sadat made his dramatic visit to Israel. A peace treaty was signed in ’79; the Sinai desert was returned to Egypt. Not one Israeli soldier has died on the Egyptian border at Egyptian hands ever since.
Finally, the Israeli idea of redrawing the borders is a close cousin of the Palestinian idea of the right of return. It’s clear to anyone who truly desires peace that the weak version of both can be managed. The borders can be redrawn to reflect contiguous concentrations of Israelis and Palestinians, but that will have to logically include the division of Jerusalem (on which Lieberman is curiously mum in his speech). Some compensation will be given the descendents of Palestinian refugees (which Lieberman of course doesn’t mention).
The strong version of this argument, however, is a straw man designed to foster conflict and promote more sinister agendas on both sides. Those on the Palestinian side who argue for the full right of return are not interested in peace, but in annihilating Israel. Those on the Israeli side, who are arguing for ethnic purity in the biblical homeland, are also not friends of peace.
When Lieberman, as he did in his U.N. speech, speaks of moving borders in the context of the Jews’ 4000 years history (and follows that quickly with the ‘loyalty oath’ vote in the Knesset, forcing non-Jewish citizens to swear allegiance to the Jewish state), most people in the region hear the subtext. Palestinians hear a call for affirming the biblical mandate on the land, which leaves them nowhere. Israeli Arabs hear a call for revoking their status as equal citizens in a democracy and redrawing Israel’s borders anew to exclude them. Neither population is bound to see these changes as gestures of peace.
Lieberman is well poised to become Israel’s prime minister in the near future, and his positions represent well the emerging Israeli zeitgeist. Israeli leftists always tell their peers on the right to make peace with the enemy now so as to avoid dealing with a more extreme enemy later. They would be well advised to give a similar advice to the Palestinians.
Yesterday’s extreme views in Israel are today’s consensus. A cross-current process has characterized Israeli extremism, with once radical views on both left and right getting their day in the mainstream.
The leftist extremist views of the 60s and 70s—demanding the return of the occupied territories for peace right after the six days war, warning of the future cancerous effects of an occupation, later calling for negotiations with the PLO for a two-state solution—have become official policy by the 1990s.
But with the failure of Oslo, the rise of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, the tide has now turned. Currently in Israel, right wing positions once considered unspeakable in polite company—population transfer; exclusion, censure or deportation of Israeli Arabs—are slowly but insistently inching into the mainstream.
The chief strategist and spokesman for this approach is current foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman, who has emerged in recent years as the type of cunning and charismatic politician who can thrive in Israeli politics even without having had a stellar army background or an ultra-orthodox flock on call. Lieberman articulated the essence of his vision in his controversial UN speech in September.
In his speech, he sought to first refute the notion that the Palestinian issue is the heart of Middle East conflict. He said: “More than ninety percent of the wars and war victims of the Middle East since the Second World War did not result from the Israeli Palestinian conflict and are in no way connected to Israel, stemming rather, from conflicts involving Moslems or conflicts between Arab States.”
Then, he sought to refute the notion that the settlements are the stumbling block to peace, noting that, “all of Judea, Samaria and Gaza were under Arab control for 19 years, between 1948 and 1967. During these 19 years, no-one tried to create a Palestinian state. Peace agreements were achieved with Egypt and Jordan despite the presence of settlements. And the opposite is also true: we evacuated twenty-one flourishing settlements in Gush Katif, and we transferred more than 10,000 Jews and in return, we have Hamas in power and thousands of missiles on Sderot and southern Israel.”
Noting that many blame the conflict for weakening response to Iran, he argued that the causal arrow goes in the opposite direction: “in searching for a durable agreement with the Palestinians, one which will deal with the true roots of the conflict and which will endure for many years, one must understand that first, the Iranian issue must be resolved.”
Lieberman then proposed that an end to the conflict must come in two stages: first, to deal with “emotional” wounds, “we should focus on coming up with a long-term intermediate agreement, something that could take a few decades. We need to raise an entire new generation that will have mutual trust and will not be influenced by incitement and extremist messages.”
Second, a redrawing of the borders must occur, creating a physical and national separation between the two ethnic groups at odds, Jews and Arabs. “Where effective separation has been achieved, conflict has either been avoided, or has been dramatically reduced or resolved. Consider the cases of the former Yugoslav republics, the split-up of Czechoslovakia and the independence of East Timor, as cases in point. Thus, the guiding principle for a final status agreement must not be land-for-peace but rather, exchange of populated territory. Let me be very clear: I am not speaking about moving populations, but rather about moving borders to better reflect demographic realities.”
He concluded with this reminder: “almost 4000 years during which the Jewish People were born in the Land of Israel, while developing the corpus of ethical and intellectual treasures that have been instrumental in giving rise to Western Civilization. 2000 years of forced exile, and interim conquest by Byzantines, Arabs, Mamelukes, Ottomans and others, cannot, and never will, impair the unbreakable bonds of the Jewish People to its homeland. Israel is not only where we are. It is who we are.”
All this sounds well and reasoned, until you consider context, logic, and subtext.
First, whether or not the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is marginal in terms of numbers, it is not marginal to the Israeli and Palestinian people at its center. And symbols attain their force not from their absolute size but from their emotional resonance. For example, Israel’s problems in absolute terms are dwarfed by problems of many other countries. Should the US therefore, in Lieberman’s view, reduce its aid to Israel to reflect that? More pointedly, most Jews don’t live in Israel, which somehow does not stop Lieberman from claiming in his speech that for Jews, “Israel is not only where we are. It is who we are.”
Second, individual settlements may or may not be stumbling blocks for peace. But overall, the settlement movement is enabled by, and manifests, the occupation, which is an inherent stumbling block for peace. The very history of the Jewish people in Israel attests to this simple fact, characterized as it’s been, in Lieberman’s own proud telling, by continual struggle against occupiers!
Moreover, applying Lieberman’s own logic, it is clear that the occupation has not bought Israel peace, quiet, and security, but rather conflict, death, world status erosion, moral decline, and toxic internal strife. Why keep such a failing program?
Third, the idea that Iran is the root cause of the conflict also defies Lieberman’s own logic. He argues that the fact the conflict continued despite withdrawals and peace achieved despite settlements renders withdrawals and settlements inessential to the conflict. But the conflict also existed well before Iran became a player; actually during the times Iran was Israel’s ally. So how can Iran be its root cause?
Now, Lieberman is right about the toxic lack of trust between Israelis and Palestinians, but there’s no evidence that a vague “intermediate” solution is more likely to hasten change than a radical shift denoted in a comprehensive peace agreement. In fact, social science shows that waiting for an attitude change to bring about a change in behavior is usually a rotten idea. It is more effective to change the laws first, and let people learn to adjust their attitudes accordingly.
Politically, examples abound of the potential efficacy of a dramatic land-for-peace agreement in ensuring stability. The Israel-Egypt peace agreement is one case in point. Egypt was Israel’s largest, most vehement and powerful enemy between 1948-1977, responsible for most Israeli war casualties. Then, Sadat made his dramatic visit to Israel. A peace treaty was signed in ’79; the Sinai desert was returned to Egypt. Not one Israeli soldier has died on the Egyptian border at Egyptian hands ever since.
Finally, the Israeli idea of redrawing the borders is a close cousin of the Palestinian idea of the right of return. It’s clear to anyone who truly desires peace that the weak version of both can be managed. The borders can be redrawn to reflect contiguous concentrations of Israelis and Palestinians, but that will have to logically include the division of Jerusalem (on which Lieberman is curiously mum in his speech). Some compensation will be given the descendents of Palestinian refugees (which Lieberman of course doesn’t mention).
The strong version of this argument, however, is a straw man designed to foster conflict and promote more sinister agendas on both sides. Those on the Palestinian side who argue for the full right of return are not interested in peace, but in annihilating Israel. Those on the Israeli side, who are arguing for ethnic purity in the biblical homeland, are also not friends of peace.
When Lieberman, as he did in his U.N. speech, speaks of moving borders in the context of the Jews’ 4000 years history (and follows that quickly with the ‘loyalty oath’ vote in the Knesset, forcing non-Jewish citizens to swear allegiance to the Jewish state), most people in the region hear the subtext. Palestinians hear a call for affirming the biblical mandate on the land, which leaves them nowhere. Israeli Arabs hear a call for revoking their status as equal citizens in a democracy and redrawing Israel’s borders anew to exclude them. Neither population is bound to see these changes as gestures of peace.
Lieberman is well poised to become Israel’s prime minister in the near future, and his positions represent well the emerging Israeli zeitgeist. Israeli leftists always tell their peers on the right to make peace with the enemy now so as to avoid dealing with a more extreme enemy later. They would be well advised to give a similar advice to the Palestinians.
